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In the Beginning, God created the Heavens and the Earth. 
-- Genesis 1:1 
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, 
having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms 
or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on 
according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning 
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and 
are being, evolved. 
-- Last sentence, Darwins Origin of Species 
 
Abstract 
 
The scientific community believes in the theory of evolution with a passion that rivals that of any 
religious belief.  This passion extends beyond the irrefutable evidence of the fossil record to the 
familiar claims of survival of the fittest and random mutation.  Yet the theory of natural 
selection has, to the knowledge of the present author, never been tested against the alternative 
hypothesis  that evolution is, in fact, the ongoing development of a single, world-spanning super-
organism.  Just what kind of evidence would settle this question is not clear, so this paper is 
intended to begin the discussion.  It does so by suggesting how a new, quantitative theory of 
pragmatic information, first presented in Weinberger (2002), might detect the widespread 
temporal and inter-species connections that a developmental view of evolution would imply. 
  
Introduction 
 The phrase the theory of evolution belies the fact of evolution.  However one quibbles with any 
particular interpretation of the fossil record, the mere existence of fossils that differ dramatically 
from anything currently living makes clear that some kind of evolution must have taken place.   
Less obvious is the cause of evolution, and it is here that reasonable doubts can be raised.  As is 
well known, the current orthodoxy of natural selection makes two distinct claims: 
i ) Every biological population has a variety of phenotypes, some of which make their 
representatives better adapted to their environment.  As a result, these phenotypes are more 
likely to contribute representatives to the next generation. 
ii ) The primary source of biological variation is random mutation of the underlying genotype. 
No doubt, biological populations do undergo natural selection, if only because survival of the 
fittest is a tautology.  What else can fitness mean besides the expected contribution of progeny to 
future generations?   The question is therefore not whether natural selection exists, but to what 
degree is it sufficient to account for Darwins endless forms most beautiful and wonderful [that] 
are being evolved.  Natural selection has been seen repeatedly in the increasing resistance of 
bacteria to antibiotics or the artificial selection imposed by human animal breeders.  However, in 
the latter case, breeding for certain desirable hereditary traits, as dog breeders have been doing for 
centuries, can also lead to a decline in other desirable traits (Grandin, 2005).  The conflicts inherent 
in optimizing for multiple traits can easily lead to locally, but not globally optimal 
genotypes/phenotypes.  The possibility, even the likelihood, of local fitness optima that might 
frustrate evolutionary hill-climbing is explored Kauffman (1993). 
We also know that there are other forces at work besides natural selection.  For example, Kimura 
(1990) proposes a theory of neutral drift, based on the idea that multiple genotypes can produce 
phenotypes of equal fitness.   An early classic of theoretical biology, Thompsons On Growth and 
Form (Thompson, 1992), observes that selection must take place within the non-trivial constraints 
imposed by the laws of physics and chemistry.  A host of more recent authors, beginning with 
Turing (1952), have demonstrated the importance of the reaction-diffusion equation of physical 
chemistry in producing a wide variety of morphologies.  Finally, Mayr (2001) stresses the 
importance of geographical isolation in the emergence of new species. 
Natural selections second claim, that the variation required for the action of natural selection is 
generated by random mutation, is somewhat more problematic because randomness can never be 
verified directly.  Randomness is generally defined as something that is incapable of being predicted 
from any algorithm, so, in principle, a demonstration of randomness requires failed predictions by 
all possible algorithms. 
A second objection to the random mutation hypothesis is the unlikelihood of order from 
disorder.  A chestnut of statistical mechanics is the idea that, given enough time and typing paper, 
a monkey pecking at a typewriter randomly will type the entire text of Shakespeares Hamlet.  What 
is left out of this story is just how long the wait will be.  As a studious undergraduate, I estimated 
that the waiting time for a diligent (and very long lived!) monkey to produce such a masterpiece 
with probability one-half was 10190,000 years, rendering this outcome effectively impossible.  The 
point of this calculation is the extremely long waiting time until this event transpires.  Perhaps 
endless forms  are being evolved, but the random process of mutation and natural selection 
may simply be incapable of producing these forms in the long, but finite time available. 
It is therefore reasonable to ask  
i ) can any of the above, either by themselves or in combination, really account for the complexity 
of living things and the unity of the biosphere? 
ii ) how much does natural selection, in particular, account for this complexity? 
If we set aside the baggage that all too often accompanies such claims, we are forced to admit that 
the possibility of some kind of overall plan of evolution is at least conceivable.  Ever since Adam 
Smith introduced the idea of the invisible hand into economics, students of that discipline have 
held market forces in high regard.  Surely this is precisely the kind of supra-rationality postulated 
for the Intelligent Designer1.  Or imagine the situation of a single conscious embryonic cell that is 
trying to make sense of evolutionary change in the developing organism, some of which is known 
(by humans) to be mediated by survival of the fittest.  We humans use the word development to 
describe the process precisely because it seems to follow a specific, pre-determined sequence of 
steps, in contrast to natural selection, which is believed to be the result of random genetic mutation.   
However, this may or may not be what our hypothetical cell would observe.  It is therefore 
reasonable to ask a final question,  
iii ) is there an experiment, or set of experiments that could detect whether the ongoing evolution of 
biological species is, in fact, the development of an ur-organism?   
This idea is not that big a leap beyond the Gaia hypothesis of J. E. Lovelock (1979), who shows that 
living things are responsible for maintaining a variety of planet-wide homeostatic equilibria2.  
                                                   
1 A testament to the collective intelligence of markets is the ongoing success of the University of Iowa futures 
market for the outcome of elections, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/.   Describing itself as  [a] real-money 
futures market in which contract payoffs depend on economic and political events such as elections, its 
futures prices have been better predictors of recent presidential elections than any opinion poll available to the 
public. 
2 One of the more remarkable of these is that of temperature, because, according to Lovelock, the sun is 
known to have increased in brightness by 25% since the life began on Earth. 
Accordingly, we choose the phrase Gaian development as a name for the view of evolution 
described in iii. 
So what light might a theory of information shed on all of this?  Development contrasts with the 
orthodox view of evolution in that the former is exquisitely coordinated and the latter is haphazard.  
Thus, a significant piece of evidence for Gaian development would be the detection of planet-wide, 
causally connected biospheric changes3, as well as evidence that causal connectivity also extended 
throughout the entire history of life on earth.  This connectivity must be mediated by some kind of 
information transfer, so perhaps a study of this transfer might hold clues to the questions raised 
above.   
Weavers lucid introduction to the paper by Shannon that began the study of information theory 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1962) observes that the effectiveness of a communications process can be 
measured by answering any of the following three questions: 
A. How accurately can the symbols that encode the message be transmitted ("the technical 
problem")? 
B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired meaning ("the semantics 
problem")? 
C. How effective is the received message in changing conduct ("the effectiveness problem")? 
 
Weaver then notes that Shannon's paper --- and thus the entire edifice of what is now known as 
"information theory" --- concerns itself only with the answer to question A.  Eigen (1971) makes 
clear the need for a theory of information semantics to advance evolutionary theory by writing  
 
This complementarity between information and entropy shows clearly the limited 
application of classical information theory to problems of evolution. It is of little 
help as long as information has not yet reached its "full meaning", or as long as 
there are still many choices for generating new information.  Here we need a new 
variable, a "value" parameter, which characterizes the level of evolution. 
The various theory of complexity that have been proposed to address question B ignore the fact 
that a signal gets parsed differently depending on how the information in it is to be acted upon.  The 
meaning of a piece of information can only be assessed by its impact, by the change in behavior of 
the receiver.  In other words, question B can only be addressed by addressing question C, which is 
what the theory of pragmatic information attempts to do. 
The essence of this theory, first outlined in Weinberger (2002), is that Shannons communications 
theory can indeed be extended to address question C.  The responses of question C can be viewed as 
                                                   
3 In fact, the fossil record indicates such changes, in the form of various mass extinctions, but the temporal 
coordination required for Gaian development has yet to be found, at least to the present authors knowledge. 
the ultimate end of the communication of question A, and thus amenable to similar mathematical 
analysis.  Weinberger (2002) also shows that the pragmatic information of the quasi-species 
equation is always increasing, thus providing the value parameter that Eigen requires. 
Because no single paper can do justice to these questions, we present here only a few initial 
thoughts on the subject, in the hope of simulating further discussion.  After presenting a summary of 
the theory of pragmatic information, we indicate how it might help to detect the connections 
between species required by Gaian development.  Detecting connections through time requires an 
extension of the theory to include a computational model of the receiver.  Since this is work in 
progress, we only sketch the relevant theory and how it might be applied.  We conclude with a 
summary, a few thoughts about future research, and the distinction between Gaian development and 
the pseudo-theory of Intelligent Design. 
 
An Introduction to the Theory of Pragmatic Information 
 
The Definition 
 
This section is a summary of the theory as presented in Weinberger (2002), which, to the best of our 
knowledge, is where the present theory was first proposed.  Because of the novelty of the theory, 
much of that paper was devoted to establishing that the definition of pragmatic information given 
there was both unique and intuitively reasonable.   
 
The formal definition of pragmatic information is informed by the diagram shown in Figure 1.  This 
diagram is to be interpreted as follows:  a decision maker, D , in some currents state, s, must choose 
among a set {a1, a2, aM} of alternatives, assumed to be finite only for simplicity of exposition.  
These choices lead to outcomes ω ∈ Ω = {ω1, ω2, , ωN}, some or all of which the decision maker 
prefers to others.  However, D s ability to produce a desired outcome is limited, perhaps because 
of one or more of the following: 
• D  has imperfect information about which of the ω's is, in fact, the best, 
• D  is unable to process the available information optimally,  
• D  is unable to guarantee that the decision made is the one actually implemented, possibly 
because of "environmental noise", e, 
• the mapping from the as to the ω's is not deterministic, 
We reflect this indeterminacy by assuming that D 's decision would result in a selection from the 
alternatives with respective probabilities q = (q1, q2, qM).   D  is then presented with a "message" 
m, one of the possible messages in message ensemble M.  Even with this new data, the best that D 
can do is to update the respective selection probabilities to pm = ( p1|m, p2|m, ... , pN |m) in such a way 
that the probability of a superior outcome is increased.   This framework suggests the following 
Definition. The pragmatic information, IM (p; q), of the message 
ensemble M is the information gain in going from  q  to pm, averaged 
over all messages m ∈ M, i.e. 
where ϕm is the marginal probability that message m was sent and  pi,m 
is the joint probability that message m was sent and outcome ωi  was 
realized. 
 
It will be assumed that, included in M is the "empty message", ν, which, by definition, results in no 
change to the a posteriori probabilities.  The presence or absence of the empty message in M makes 
no difference to the computation, as the terms involving ν evaluate to zero.  However, the ability 
to write qi = pi|ν will eliminate potential confusion in the discussion of joint and conditional 
pragmatic information below. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Figure 1 has some notable additions to similar diagrams included in discussions of classical 
information theory, beginning with Shannon and Weaver (1962).  This is because standard 
information theory considers only the receivers ability to distinguish the message from the other 
messages that could have been sent.  Here, however, the explicit inclusion of a decision maker is 
central to the theory4. 
 
Some Basic Lemmas 
 
We will be using the following, which are also presented for their intrinsic interest, in the 
sequel.  Note that the numbering of the lemmas here are not those of Weinberger (2002). 
 
                                                   
4 See Weinberger (2002) for additional discussion. 
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Lemma 1: If the symbols M and Ω have the same meaning as above, 
pragmatic information has the following three equivalent 
characterizations in terms of the (Shannon) entropy (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1962).   
Let  
     H (M) = - ∑m ϕm log2 ϕm, 
the entropy of the message ensemble M, let  
     H (Ω) = - ∑i qi log2 qi, 
the entropy of the outcome ensemble O, let 
    H (Ω |M)= - ∑i,m  pi,m log2 pi|m , 
the conditional entropy of the outcomes, given the various messages , and let 
     H (M | Ω)
 
= - ∑ i,m  pi,m log2 p m| i, 
the conditional entropy of the messages, given a particular outcome.   Then 
             IM  (p; q)  = H (M)  + H (Ω) - H (Ω,M) 
                = H (Ω) - H (Ω|M)
,
 
                  = H (M)
 
 - H (M | Ω) 
 
Because H (M | Ω) ≥ 0, it follows immediately from the third identity that  
 
Lemma 2:  The pragmatic information of a message ensemble is 
always bounded above by its Shannon entropy.    
 
We also need the notions of joint and conditional pragmatic information.  The joint 
pragmatic information of message ensembles M and N , IM ,N  (p; q), is  
where pω,m,n is the joint probability that both m and n were sent and ω was realized and pω|m,n is the 
conditional probability that ω was realized, conditional on both m and n being sent. 
Finally, we have the all-important  
Lemma 3:    I M ,N  (p; q)   = I M |N (p; q)  + I N (p; q) 
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Proof:   
 
The pragmatic independence of two message ensembles, M  and N , is the condition that  
I M |N  (p; q)   = I M  (p; q). 
We note in passing that this condition is not equivalent to the independence of the individual 
message probabilities, expressed mathematically as pm,n = pm pn.  Once again, Weinberger (2002) 
has details. 
The Pragmatic Information of a Process 
The remainder of this paper will be concerned with the pragmatic information of various processes.  
For the purposes of the applications below, only cases involving one or two points in time need be 
considered.  For example, we might want to make predictions at time t  that use the state of the 
process at t1 < t  to predict whether the process assumes the same states at at t < t2 .  In the general 
case, where the joint probability of observing the process in state i at time t1 and state j at  
time t2 is pi,k (t1, t2), the pragmatic information is 
 
In the limit of complete novelty (maximum Shannon entropy), pi(t1) = pk(t1) = pk(t2), for all 
states i and k, and for all times t1 and t2.   Since we also have pi,k (t1, t2) = pi(t1) pk(t2) in that 
case (Otherwise, the conditional entropy of the state at t2, given the state at t1 will not be a 
maximum.),  it follows that 
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Lemma 4: The pragmatic information of a process is zero in the 
limit of complete novelty.  
 
We note the important role that additivity plays in the above.  We also note that this result, 
combined with Lemma 2, above, proves a conjecture of Atmanspacher and Scheingraber 
(1991). 
 
An Application to Evolutionary Dynamics 
In this section, we apply the above theory to an evolving population of biological replicators.   
Each individual within this population belongs to one of N well defined sub-populations, each of 
which can be assumed to be in the large population (continuous) limit.  Also, each individual has 
some sub-population dependent reproduction rate, which may also depend on the magnitude of 
other sub-populations.  We identify the probability vector p = (p1, p2, pi, ) with  the relative 
frequencies of the replicator sub-populations.  This vector can also be interpreted as the probability 
of choosing a single individual at random from the overall population and finding that this 
individual belongs to each of the successive sub-populations.  Because the samples at successive 
times ti and tk are independent, the pragmatic information in this case is given by 
∑k pk(t2) log2[pk(t2)/ pk(t1)]. 
Weinberger (2002) demonstrates that one of the simplest of evolutionary dynamical systems, the 
quasispecies, given by  
dp(t) /dt  = W p(t) - p(t) [1T W p(t)] = [W - Ω(t)] p(t), 
with 1 a column vector of all 1's,  W a square matrix whose diagonal elements Wii represent the 
(constant) rates at which replicators of type i are copied successfully, and whose off-diagonal 
elements, Wij, represent the (constant) rates at which type j is produced because of mutations while 
copying type i, [1T W p(t)] = Ω(t), and T is the transpose operation.  Both this equation and the 
more general systems below satisfy 1T p(t) = 1 for all t. 
We might try to generalize this result to the so-called replicator dynamics discussed in detail in 
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), given by 
dp/dt  = diag [p] [f(p)  1 < f >]. 
Here, diag[ p] is the diagonal matrix with the components of p along its main diagonal,  f is a vector 
valued fitness function that maps RN into the unit simplex, and < f > is 1T f.  The formal solution 
to this equation is  
    pi (t) = exp{∫0t [fi (p(τ)) - < f > ]} dτ  pi(0)  
= exp[∫0t fi (p(τ)) dτ] pi(0) /{ Σk exp[∫0t fk (p(τ)) dτ] pk (0)}, 
so that the expression for the pragmatic information of the system at time t, given its initial 
conditions is given by 
log2 e ∑i  pi (t) {∫0t [fi (p(τ))    < f > ] dτ}. 
This expression can be interpreted as the time averaged growth rate of the system.  Since it is well 
known that some kinds of replicator systems, such as the hypercycle, have limit cycles as their 
unique long term solution, it must be the case that the pragmatic information for these systems is 
non-monotonic.  We conjecture, but, as yet, have been unable to prove that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the pragmatic information for a system to be montonic is that the Jacobian 
matrix [∂fi /∂pj] has real eigenvalues. 
The time averaged growth rate of the entire biosphere has been far from monotonic, suggesting that 
the pragmatic information gathered during earlier times is sometimes discarded.  There have, for 
example, been a number of major extinction events, where as many as 90% of the species then 
existing became extinct.  At first glance, this seems to be a powerful argument against intelligent 
design.  However, vestigial organs, such as gills, form and are then reabsorbed during the 
development of the human embryo, so perhaps extinction events should be viewed as something 
similar, given the theory of Gaian development. 
Another quantity that might indicate Gaian development is the degree of co-evolution in the 
population dynamics of the biosphere.   That co-evolution must play a significant role in the 
determination of fitness follows from the fact that all predator-prey, parasitic, and symbiotic 
relationships are co-evolutionary.  In fact, it is widely believed that modern eukariotic cells are the 
result of the ever tighter symbiosis between mitochondria and the rest of the cell.   
The theory of pragmatic information suggests a means of quantitatively characterizing the degree of 
co-evolution between two or more species, namely the pragmatic information in the population of 
one or more species, given the population of the others.  Suppose q is the vector of populations of 
the message species and p is the vector of populations of the output species in the replicator 
equations, then the equations for the growth of p and q are 
dp/dt  = diag [p] [f(p, q)  1 < f(p, q) >]. 
and 
dq/dt  = diag [q] [g(p, q)  1 < g (p, q)>], 
where g is the fitness function for the qs.  From the point of view of the present theory, co-
evolution is indicated when p given q has significant pragmatic information.  Since we are trying to 
determine whether the dynamics of q matter to p, we compare p as per the recipe of the above 
equations to p computed with q frozen at its initial value, q0.  In other words, we compute not just 
p as per the recipe of the above equations, but also φ, the solution to  
dφ/dt  = diag [φ] [f(φ, q0)  1 < f(φ, q0) >]. 
The pragmatic information, given a specific value for q0, is then  
∑k,l pk(t) ql(t) log2[pk(t) ql(t) / φk(t) ql(0)]. 
We note that p and q as computed above are not independent, because each depends on the history 
of the vector (p, q). 
Using the formal solution to the replicator equation given above, we have 
∑k,l pk(t) ql(t) {∫0t [fi (p(τ), q(τ))    1 < f(p(τ), q(τ)) >] dτ + 
 ∫0t [gi (p(τ), q(τ))    1 < f(p(τ), q(τ)) >] dτ  ∫0t [fi (φ(τ), q0)    1 < f(φ(τ), q0) >] dτ }. 
The first term in the above expression is the component of the pragmatic information directly 
involving p, as affected by q, the last expression as the component directly involving p, without 
information regarding q, and the middle term as the component as the indirect influence of p on 
itself, as mediated by q.  Note that this middle term might not be obvious without the pragmatic 
information framework.  Note also that the relative sizes of these terms allow us to quantify the 
relative importance of the interaction with the q species. 
 
Randomness in the Message and Computational Models of the Receiver 
 
We turn now to the question of detecting the temporal connections required to distinguish Gaian 
development from random mutations.  To do this, we must consider the fact that some receivers, 
because they can apply more sophisticated algorithms to the incoming messages, can make more 
sophisticated, and thus more pragmatically informative decisions.  More memory, more different 
types of primitive calculations, etc. can be used to fashion a better decision making algorithm.  
However, these quantitative increments obscure the qualitative increases in computing power 
obtained by ascending the so-called Chomsky hierarchy (Hopcroft, et. al., 2000).  The Chomsky 
hierarchy is a series of abstract machines intended to emit a single accept/ reject output signal 
if a sequence of input symbols is a member of a particular set of such symbols (the language).  In 
our terminology, the machine is making a single decision, and thus emitting a single symbol, ω.  
If we are interested in the ongoing response of the observer to a stream of symbols, we consider the 
machine to be making a series of decisions.  We assume, in the most general case, the doubly 
infinite input sequence of symbols,  
 
α-n, α-(n-1), α-(n-2),  α-1, α0, α1,  αn, αn+1 
 
and that the output process is another doubly infinite, discrete stream of symbols  
 
ω-n, ω-(n-1), ω-(n-2),  ω-1, ω0, ω1,  ωn, ωn+1. 
 
We now enumerate the models in the hierarchy and discuss their relevance to the present case. 
 
The Finite State Machine 5 
 
The simplest model in this hierarchy is also the most sophisticated model of a finite computation, 
the finite state machine (FSM).  This model maintains a single state variable, s, and a state transition 
table, T, with an entry for each possible input pair (αk, s).  Each such entry, (ωk, snext), specifies the 
symbol, ωk, to output and the next state, snext.  ωk can be assumed to be no output, without loss of 
generality. 
 
The Stack Automaton 
 
The next more general model in the hierarchy augments the FSM with a stack, a data structure 
that stores the state at each iteration according to a first in, last out (FIFO) rule.  In other words, 
each time a state is stored, or pushed onto the stack, that state, and only that state can be retrieved.  
Each previous state can only be accessed by popping, or retrieving the subsequently stored states 
from the stack, in reverse order of storage.  Once retrieved, a state is forgotten if it is overwritten 
in the FSM by a subsequent state.  The stack automaton can clearly implement an FSM by simply 
ignoring the stack, demonstrating that the former is strictly more powerful than the latter. 
 
In theory, the stack can grow arbitrarily long; in practice, stack overflow is sometimes an issue for 
most problems, but less so as memory sizes increase.  However, the amount of data that might need 
to be analyzed to identify departures from randomness in mutation rates could easily exceed the 
largest of currently available computer memories.  It seems, for example, that mutation rates for a 
given gene can depend on the three dimensional structure of the proteins for which the gene codes 
(Liò and Goldman, 1998). 
                                                   
5 Technically, a finite state machine with output is known as a Mealy machine.  We retain the more familiar 
terminology. 
 
Turing Machine 
 
A Turing machine, which sits atop the Chomsky hierarchy, is an FSM with the following 
modifications and additions:  
• a doubly infinite tape of discrete cells, each of which can store a single value,   
• a mechanism for reading from and/or writing to a single cell, and, possibly, advancing the tape 
one cell to the left or right of the current one,   
• an enlargement of the current state of the FSM to include, not just the current internal state, but 
also the contents of the cell currently under the read/write mechanism, 
• an enlargement of the next state of the FSM to include the contents, if any, to be written to the 
cell currently under the read/write mechanism. 
Thus, the state transition table becomes a mapping from the current state of the FSM and the data on 
the tape to the next state of the FSM 
 
The Turing machine is widely considered to be the most powerful of the abstract computing 
paradigms, as Turing machines can implement every other known computing paradigm.  For many 
purposes, the assumption of ain infinite tape is reasonable because the amount of memory actually 
available in modern computers is typically much larger than the data that is being processed.  This 
fact has made the Turing machine an attractive paradigm for theoretical studies.  However, the 
practical problems surrounding the stack of the stack automaton arise even more forcefully for the 
doubly infinite tape of the Turing machine. 
 
All three of the above computing paradigms can be analyzed using the same mathematical 
framework, but the simplest case involves the FSM.   We therefore consider that case first, and 
introduce some notation.  We adopt the convention that a superscript identifies a particular value for 
a symbol or a particular state, and a subscript identifies the location of the symbol in the input 
sequence or the resulting state.  Thus, we let αl be the lth of the L possible symbols that can appear at 
a given position in the message, αn be the symbol that appears in the nth position in the message 
(whatever αl that symbol happens to be), and αn be the sequence of message symbols up to and 
including the nth (so that αn = αn-1 αn ).  We assume further that there are F states, S1, S2, , SF, in 
the FSM and that the indicator function 1{(Si, αl) → (Sj, αm)} = 1 if and only if symbol αl can induce 
a transition between state Si and state Sj and if the symbol αm follows αl in the input sequence. 
 
The dynamics of the FSM, and thus its sequence of output ωs, is determined by the transition 
matrix T, whose p, qth component is given by 
 
Tpq = Pr{αn = αl || αn-1} 1{(Si, αl) → (Sj, αm)}, 
 
where Pr{αn = αl || αn-1} is the probability that αl appears immediately after αn-1 and p = (i  1) L + l  
and q = (j  1) L + m.  Consider first the special case in which  
 
Pr{αn = αl || αn-1} = Pr{αn = αl | αn-1 = αk }; 
 
in other words, the message is a stationary6, first order Markov process.  T is then the LF X LF 
matrix whose components are given by Tpq = Pr{αn = αl | αn-1 = αk }1{(Si, αl) → (Sj, αm)}.  We also 
introduce the LF dimensional vector v(n) = (πn1, πn2 , , πnF, πn1, πn2 , , πnF, ,  πn1, πn2 , , πnF), 
which has L copies of the vector of probabilities that the FSM is in each of its F states after input αn.   
Since the matrix-vector product of  v(n-1) T is v(n), we see that the dynamics are those of a stationary 
Markov chain with states corresponding to the LF possible ordered pairs (Si, αl).   While the detailed 
dynamics depends on the details of the T matrix, the theory of finite Markov chains (Isaacson and 
Madsen, 1976) tells us that, generically, the system will spend a finite amount of time in a set of so-
called transient states, after which it settles into a set of ergodic states.  Once there, as successive 
symbols in the message are processed, the probability distribution of states converges exponentially 
to an invariant distribution that is independent of the initial distribution.  Further investigation is 
required, but it appears that the long term dependencies on mutations required for Gaian 
development cannot occur in this case.  
 
Assuming that the probabilities of successive message symbols depend on M  > 1 previous symbols 
does not qualitatively change things, because T has the finite dimension FLM.  The situation is, 
however, qualitatively different if the Markov chain is sufficiently non-stationary in a sense that 
is made precise in Isaacson and Madsen, 1976.  This situation and the situation in which the symbol 
sequence is non-Markovian must be left to future research.  A complication that arises in this latter 
case is the fact that the T matrix becomes infinite dimensional.  
 
Summary and Thoughts about Future Research 
In contrast to standard evolutionary theory, Gaian development emphasizes co-evolutionary 
processes, coordinated genetic mutations, and other mechanisms for transmitting information from 
one evolving species to another.  This paper is a first attempt to analyze these information flows, 
using results from the quantitative theory of pragmatic information summarized above.  However, 
this theory already suggests ways of quantifying 
• the rate of evolution 
• the decomposition of that rate into a co-evolutionary component and a component 
dependent only on the single species under consideration 
                                                   
6 This stationarity assumption is a standard one in current models of gene substitution (See Liò and Goldman, 
1998, for details.). 
• the rate at which an observer with a finite memory would lose the ability to remember the 
distant past 
In future work, we hope to obtain corresponding results for an observer with effectively infinite 
memory, which may be qualitatively different. 
While much of the advance of the above theory probably will come from a closer contact with 
empirical results, pragmatic information might also be of use in understanding the instabilities that 
can arise as the result of network effects.  These effects might underlie such diverse phenomena as 
the mass extinctions of biological species (Solé et. al., 1999) and stock market crashes (Sornette, 
2003). 
We close by making the distinction between Gaian development and that stalking horse for 
Creationism, Intelligent Design.  The latter is the view that the biosphere was shaped by an 
intelligent agency outside of nature, a view that has been roundly rejected by the scientific 
community.  In contrast, this paper argues for a naturalistic extension to the standard Darwinian 
paradigm that may Gaian development, a version of intelligent design in which the intelligence is an 
emergent property of the biosphere, is more scientifically plausible. 
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